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02.11.2026 12:01Kyiv’s preparations for the heating season have triggered another flare-up between the presidential office and the city hall.
Bankova discussed removing Vitali Klitschko from the post of head of the Kyiv City State Administration (KCSA), but ultimately decided to take a different path.
On October 13, the president said that even in border and frontline regions, energy resilience plans are being implemented better than in the capital. He noted that even after Russian strikes, a significant part of Kyiv remains without electricity and water, and announced decisions that would involve not only strengthening the protection of energy facilities but also changing approaches to city governance.
That same day, Zelensky reported consultations with representatives of the security sector, business, and local self-government. Among those he spoke with were former SBU head Vasyl Maliuk, businessman Kostiantyn Yefimenko, and Kharkiv mayor Ihor Terekhov. This immediately gave rise to rumors that Zelensky intends to field some serious opponent against Klitschko in Kyiv. All the more so since the current acting head of the Kyiv City Military Administration (KCMA), Andrii Tkachev, is not known for particular public activity.
“He is still looking at different people and talking to them,” an informed source told RBC-Ukraine at the time, when asked whether the same Maliuk might soon head the KCMA.
However, the military administration is only one part of the complex system of governing the capital. Alongside it work the KCSA headed by Klitschko and the Kyiv Council elected by Kyiv residents. This system has previously given rise to conflicts over powers and responsibilities.
According to RBC-Ukraine, Bankova also discussed a more radical scenario. Two sources told the publication independently of each other that the presidential circle considered the possibility of removing Klitschko from the post of head of the Kyiv City State Administration. According to the sources, one of the proponents of this idea was former head of the Presidential Office Andrii Yermak.
However, as the sources claim, most influential representatives of the presidential team — both at Bankova and outside it — came out categorically against it. Primarily because of the legal and governance consequences of such a decision. The fact is that in Kyiv the posts of city mayor and head of the KCSA are closely linked. Although the head of the state administration is formally appointed by the president, according to a Constitutional Court ruling, it must be headed by the city mayor elected by Kyiv residents. Moreover, even removing Klitschko from the leadership of the state administration would not deprive him of the powers of an elected mayor and his influence over the Kyiv Council.
“In theory this could be done, but in practice the city governance scheme would become even less workable than it is now. Klitschko would block everything through the Kyiv Council. Even access to offices could be a problem,” one of the publication’s sources explains.
All the more so since such a personnel change would certainly not resolve the structural problems in Kyiv’s governance under martial law.
“The KCMA is a dead-end branch of development. Look at Tkachenko (Tymur Tkachenko, the current head of the Kyiv Regional Military Administration — ed.), he seemed to try to fight with Klitschko, and what came of it? Later he himself asked to be released,” another source says.
In addition, any attempts to somehow limit the “sovereignty” of the capital’s authorities would inevitably provoke serious pushback from the mayor and his allies. Two factors work in Klitschko’s favor here: the importance of local self-government as such in the eyes of Europeans, and Klitschko’s very good connections in the European establishment, including in Germany. As sources in the government previously said, this factor has already hindered overly harsh actions by Bankova against Klitschko. According to RBC-Ukraine, even now, when everything is limited to verbal sparring, response signals have been sent from Khreshchatyk to Brussels, and European partners have begun to express their concern.
“Perhaps Bankova has realized that the potential negative fallout for the situation in Kyiv falls equally on the center and on the local authorities. No one at the KCMA wants to fight with him. Then the mayor spoke in the Rada, where he responded to complaints about the city’s preparations. And somewhere after that, the central government’s rhetoric regarding Klitschko softened somewhat,” said one source in the mayor’s team.
In the end, Zelensky publicly proposed a softer option — to create a special “cabinet” under the government to address Kyiv’s problems.
“I asked the prime minister to assemble a special cabinet for Kyiv — business managers, strong people. I am ready to personally talk to whomever they name to me and ask him. Set up such a cabinet and develop solutions. I will do what I can,” Zelensky said at a meeting with journalists on October 27.
The president, in particular, named several people with whom he had spoken about participating in such a cabinet: former deputy prime minister Oleksandr Kubrakov, and former prime minister from Poroshenko’s time Volodymyr Groysman. But former head of the State Agency for Reconstruction Serhii Sukhomlyn, according to Zelensky, refused to take part “as soon as he heard about Kyiv.”
According to RBC-Ukraine, the new body may have about a dozen members and will have a consultative or advisory status. That is, its members will not be able to directly issue orders to Kyiv’s authorities. They will propose their solutions to the Cabinet of Ministers, which will then implement them through existing state mechanisms. Such a structure would allow Bankova to more actively influence the resolution of the capital’s problems without conflictually removing Klitschko.
“Why create another energy council or cabinet? The city authorities already have their own council on energy security and resilience, which has involved industry experts. And it took part in preparing the city’s resilience plan,” a source in the mayor’s circle reacts to this idea.
At the same time, Klitschko’s team does not rule out that the “center” may return to the issue of removing the mayor later — when the situation in the city is at its most difficult, using the incompleteness of the city’s preparations for winter as a political pretext. This version is “fueled” by the NSDC decision of August 5, which spoke of the personal responsibility of officials for carrying out resilience plan measures.
“It is impossible to fulfill this plan perfectly. In any case there will be some gaps, something somewhere will go wrong. This could turn into an argument against the mayor,” the source suggested.
However, the NSDC decision itself does not mean Klitschko’s automatic dismissal or legal liability. This requires separate legal grounds and a procedure.
RBC-Ukraine sources from various political camps agree that this year the Kyiv authorities did more to prepare for the heating season than last year. At the same time, not all the equipment that the city authorities are now reporting on appeared precisely this year: the capital accumulated part of its reserves back in previous years of the full-scale war.
According to the KCSA, about 700 generators are now prepared for heat and water supply facilities. They are supposed to ensure the operation of pumps and other important equipment during power outages. Three diesel power plants have also been built for the needs of the water supply system. In addition, the city authorities report the creation of a backup water intake and the provision of backup power to the sewage system. This should make it possible to maintain water supply and drainage even during disruptions in centralized power supply.
For emergency heating of individual buildings, Kyiv has 70 mobile and eight block-modular boiler houses. They can be used, for example, for hospitals and social institutions left without main heat supply. Most of this reserve was formed back in previous years.
Separately, the KCSA reports more than six thousand units of equipment — generators, inverters, and batteries — purchased under city programs for residential buildings. It is intended to support the operation of individual building systems during blackouts, not for full power supply to all apartments.
Another area is the installation of cogeneration units, that is, small power plants that simultaneously produce electricity and heat. However, the scale of such generation is not yet commensurate with the capital’s overall needs. In winter, Kyiv’s load may reach about 1,950 MW, whereas the city has so far launched only 60 MW of cogeneration capacity, and plans to bring it to 200 MW by the end of the year. According to RBC-Ukraine sources, from 200 to more than 300 MW of local generation is required just to maintain the operation of critical infrastructure.
In addition to creating reserves, the city and central authorities are carrying out work on the physical protection of important energy facilities from Russian attacks. Some of the measures are carried out by the KCSA, others by the state Agency for Reconstruction. These works are not yet fully completed.
The largest, but at the same time one of the most problematic areas of preparation remains the creation of backup heat supply in case of new destruction of large thermal power plants. Unlike mobile boiler houses intended for temporary heating of individual buildings, this concerns capacities that provide heat to entire residential districts. Overall, Kyiv’s resilience plan provides for the creation of such heat sources with a capacity of up to 2.1 GW. This year, work was launched on approximately 1.6 GW: the city is responsible for building facilities with a capacity of more than 1,000 MW, and the state Agency for Reconstruction for about 560 MW, including six backup boiler houses.
However, far from all of these facilities are already ready for operation. The publication’s sources doubt that all the capacities planned to be launched this year will be commissioned before the end of the year. At the end of October, the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development also confirmed the incomplete construction. Klitschko himself said in an interview with BBC Ukraine on October 23 that Kyiv’s overall resilience plan has been fulfilled by more than 60%, and the city plans to complete its implementation by December.
RBC-Ukraine sources acknowledge: despite the significant amount of work done, both the city authorities and state structures were late with some of the necessary measures. One source in the government cites as an example the delay in adopting necessary decisions at the level of the Kyiv Council. In particular, according to him, decisions on the placement of energy equipment were delayed; the necessary vote took place only in September, although the decisions were ready back in May. The Agency for Reconstruction also previously spoke publicly about problems with land issues that held up the launch of the project.
“Could the capital’s thermal power plants have been fully restored? No. Could cogeneration have been installed in parallel? Yes. Could work with electricity distribution systems have been done better? Yes. Overall, preparations could have been 30-50% better, but not one hundred percent,” says one source in the government.
At the same time, he does not entirely absolve the central authorities of blame.
“We still treat Klitschko as a political opponent, with the corresponding consequences,” the source says.
Sources in the mayor’s circle, in turn, draw attention to the difficulties with coordination and financing of projects specifically on the part of the central authorities. Kyiv’s resilience plan began to be developed back in the spring, but it was finally approved at the NSDC level only in August. Klitschko’s team believes that the delay in approving the document cost the city important time. The central government has a different position: the initial version needed revision, and its implementation on the proposed scale was financially unrealistic. In the meantime, the cost of the planned measures was nevertheless reduced from 67 to 37 billion hryvnias (about €728.8 million).
In the autumn, delays arose with budget payments. The KCSA said at the time that because of this, part of the work on backup heat supply and power supply had to be suspended. In October, payments began to be unblocked. The government also confirmed problems with expenditures, explaining them by a temporary shortage of funds.
“Overall, of course, we prepared for this winter better than for the last one. But the problem is that we prepared for last year’s challenges, and new ones have appeared: jet drones, a shortage of anti-ballistic systems, etc.,” says another source.
After numerous Russian strikes, Kyiv’s energy infrastructure is already much more damaged than at the start of last heating season. Therefore, despite large reserves, RBC-Ukraine sources do not rule out that this winter could be even harder for the capital than the previous one.
One of the biggest problems now is the operation of Kyiv’s thermal power plants. Under normal conditions, they both provided the city with heat and generated significant amounts of electricity for the capital. According to the sources, TPP-5, TPP-6, and the Darnytsia TPP stopped producing electricity as a result of Russian strikes. Now Kyiv is heavily dependent on its supply “from outside” through Ukraine’s unified energy system — via substations that are also systematically subjected to enemy attacks and periodically fail. If these facilities are damaged, even with electricity available in the nationwide system, it may be difficult to deliver it to the capital. Kyiv residents already felt the consequences of such problems on October 8, when the subway temporarily stopped due to voltage drops from external power centers.
One source explains: the subway is a very large energy consumer, so in the event of new Russian strikes and sudden problems with Kyiv’s power supply, decisions may be made to temporarily shut down precisely such facilities in order to quickly stabilize the system. Or, in the event of a catastrophic electricity shortage, the subway essentially “goes dark” on its own.
The situation with heat supply is no less difficult. Kyiv’s thermal power plants remain among the priority targets of Russian attacks. New damage could also jeopardize their supply of heat, and the backup boiler houses that are supposed to partially replace the large stations are not all ready for operation yet. At the same time, even the launch of all planned backup boiler houses does not guarantee





