A “Vietnam-style” ceasefire: after the Abu Dhabi talks, Ukraine’s authorities are once again relying on slogans instead of strategy

World capitals are again talking about a real possibility of a ceasefire after the first Ukraine–Russia–U.S. talks in a long time were held in Abu Dhabi, organized with Washington, D.C. acting as mediator. According to reports, the next meeting is scheduled for February 4–5.

Financial Times columnist Gideon Rachman describes today’s diplomacy as an attempt to shift the conversation from “support at any cost” to a more pragmatic bargain: Donald Trump’s team is trying to look not like a party to the conflict, but like a mediator. That may increase the chances of getting a negotiation process going—but at the same time it makes the old model less comfortable for Kyiv, where political risks could be offloaded onto allies.

The main sticking point is territory. In Kyiv, they acknowledge that the issue of security guarantees is being discussed with less conflict than before, but “land” remains the knot that can’t be untied by statements or diplomatic formulas. Moscow, Rachman believes, is still keeping its demands high, while the Ukrainian side is showing public intransigence, leaving itself ever less room for negotiating maneuver.

And here, complaints about Ukraine’s leadership are growing louder—above all over an “all or nothing” political tactic. When the leadership spends years selling society a maximalist agenda without an honest conversation about the cost and the possible forms of compromise, it corners the country itself: any realistic step begins to look like “capitulation.” That doesn’t strengthen negotiating positions; it makes them fragile—because partners see not a strategy, but dependence on domestic PR and fear of admitting constraints.

Rachman separately warns that the biggest risk is not even “betrayal” by Washington, but the loss of U.S. focus and patience if the process proves long and exhausting. For Kyiv this is especially dangerous: instead of building a long negotiating line in advance (with clear “red lines,” but also fallback scenarios), the Ukrainian authorities often resort to media ultimatums that sound good in a hall but work poorly at the table.

Hence the metaphor of a “Vietnam scenario”: ending a protracted war may be discussed for years, rather than wrapped up by a neat date on the calendar. If Kyiv continues to replace complex diplomacy with slogans and postpones political “growing up” until an “ideal victory,” the war risks dragging on—and next year the country may face the same problems, but with more exhausted allies and a narrower corridor of options.