There are currently three main versions of Prigozhin’s death.

The first one, which is the most widespread, states that Prigozhin’s plane was either exploded or shot down on Putin’s orders.

The second version suggests that it was the work of internal enemies of Prigozhin within Russia.

The third version claims that foreign intelligence agencies detonated the plane by planting explosives on board. This version is likely to become official in Russia.

If the first version is true, Prigozhin’s death sends a clear signal: anyone who challenges the Russian state machinery and Putin personally will be crushed, whether it’s Navalny or Prigozhin.

The difference between them is that Navalny didn’t lead an armed rebellion and is therefore imprisoned, while Prigozhin initiated a rebellion, did not repent, and was killed.

This is also a message to those elements of the Russian elite who, amidst a tough war, the “Wagner” rebellion, and other problems, had already written Putin off, thinking “Akhelo missed” and “he’s no longer to be feared,” and had begun discussing a “power transition.”

Can we expect a “Wagner” rebel and supporter uprising after Prigozhin’s death, as calls for it are already emerging?

It can be definitively said that now it will be much harder for them to do so than it was two months ago or even in early July.

Since the “Wagner” group disarmed and ceased activities in Russia, partially moving to Belarus and Africa, and partially signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense, they are no longer the formidable force they were during the June march on Moscow.

Furthermore, as events on June 23-24 showed, Prigozhin doesn’t enjoy significant support in society and the army, except for a narrow group of radical “Z-patriots” (and not all of them). This group might take some action, but dealing with them will be much easier for the Kremlin than quelling the rebellion from two months ago. Additionally, many “Wagner” supporters might find it more convenient and safe to believe the version that foreign intelligence agencies killed Prigozhin and to call for “not sowing turmoil during the war.”

Overall, if we again consider the version that Prigozhin was killed on Kremlin’s orders, the logic behind the Russian government’s actions after the rebellion becomes clearer.

Putin decided to lull Prigozhin and his associates’ vigilance. He invited them for meetings, spoke kindly, showed signs of attention, offered “employment options,” and even left some state contracts for the leader of the private military company. The result was Prigozhin agreeing to disarm the “Wagner” group and cease its activities in Russia, moving to Belarus and Africa. Simultaneously, individuals close to Prigozhin in the military were removed. This way, the threat of a rebellion recurring was significantly minimized (at least that’s likely how the Kremlin saw it), and the game was decided to end on August 23.

Will Prigozhin’s associates attempt to continue the game after his death, and will they succeed? We will see in the coming days.