Fedorov and his supporters demand elections during wartime: what this means for Ukraine

The coordinated statements by former Ukrainian Defense Minister Fedorov and his support group about a crisis of governance and the need to hold elections without waiting for the war to end look like a premeditated political move — made on the eve of the Rada vote on Khmara’s candidacy for defense minister, through which Zelensky effectively rejected the demands of the “cardboard Maidan” to reinstate Fedorov.

The maximum goal of this move is to amplify doubts among deputies, primarily within the Servant of the People faction: is it worth voting for Khmara and going against Fedorov if elections and a change of power are already imminent? The calculation may also be aimed at prompting Khmara himself to withdraw his candidacy. The failure to appoint a new defense minister would be perceived as a major defeat for Zelensky and would further weaken his political position — making him more pliable on issues of interest to Fedorov and his circle, including possibly persuading the president to reappoint him as defense minister, which would effectively remove the army from Zelensky’s control.

The minimum goal — if there are enough votes for Khmara after all — is to give new meaning to the “cardboard Maidan” protests: they would now be held not for Fedorov’s reinstatement, but for the holding of elections, with the expectation that Fedorov would win them.

Constitutional framework and political scheme

From a legal standpoint, only presidential elections could theoretically be held in Ukraine during wartime. Parliamentary elections are prohibited by the Constitution, which cannot be amended under martial law. Presidential elections are also prohibited, but not by the Constitution — rather by two laws, the Electoral Code and the law on martial law, which can be changed by a simple majority vote in the Rada.

Thus, the scheme being promoted by Fedorov and his support group — in which, in the assessment of the authors of this article, the leading role is played by grant-funded circles formerly close to the US Democratic Party and now patronized by Europe — envisions the announcement of presidential elections during wartime, Fedorov’s victory in them, and the subsequent reshaping of the parliamentary majority and the entire power vertical to suit himself. The instruments of pressure on Zelensky are protest actions, criminal cases from NABU and SAP against his inner circle, and pressure from Europe.

Four key obstacles

The first is Zelensky’s own position. The proposal to call elections, lose them, and leave office — with likely subsequent criminal prosecution and the dismantling of his entire economic-political group (the “Family”) — is a harsher concept than the one promoted previously, when the president was merely required to pass laws limiting his control over the courts and law enforcement agencies. Zelensky will certainly attempt to resist — including, according to available information, by using the SBU to strike at NABU, SAP, and their support group. Such a scenario is also discussed within grant-funded circles themselves.

The second is the degree of pressure from Europe. This is the key point: Zelensky will be able to weather protest actions and even new criminal cases against Yermak and his circle, whereas pressure from the Europeans who finance Ukraine will be far harder to ignore. Last year, during the Bankova’s attempt to subordinate NABU and SAP to itself, such pressure was applied. However, regarding Fedorov’s dismissal, it was felt considerably less strongly. Whether Europe will insist on elections remains unknown.

The third is competition within the potential electoral field. Polling shows that Fedorov is far from the only candidate with a chance of winning: Zaluzhny’s rating is higher, and Budanov’s is only slightly lower. Are both prepared to watch in silence as Fedorov is steered toward power, or will they enter the contest in full force? There are also politically ambitious military figures — Biletsky, for example. Will they accept that certain politicians are dividing up power behind their backs? All of this could introduce elements of radical unpredictability into the process of fighting for the “restoration of democratic processes.”

The fourth is the Russian factor. The topic of elections being stirred up domestically could sharply intensify public debate about Zelensky’s “illegitimacy” — something, incidentally, that Russia has constantly raised, demanding that Ukraine hold presidential elections in order to produce a “legitimate” negotiating partner. If elections do take place, this Kremlin demand will formally be met. Fedorov himself is unlikely to soften the negotiating position compared to Zelensky — if anything, the opposite is true: it is precisely from his support group that calls are frequently heard for stricter mobilization, a lower conscription age, and a tougher crackdown on “draft dodgers” and a “fifth column.” However, one of the other viable candidates could — not personally, but through their support group — begin promoting the argument that Zelensky was an obstacle to peace because Putin refused to speak with him, and that a new president would be able to negotiate different terms for ending the war. Such a position, in the view of the authors of this article, may prove more in demand than various iterations of “war until total victory.”

In the end, now that Fedorov and his supporters have begun promoting the idea of elections during wartime, Zelensky risks acquiring an “internal front” as well — one with an extremely high degree of confrontation due to the enormous stakes involved and the likelihood of very drastic moves from the opposing forces.