
Ksyusha Maneken, an escort who received the award ‘For Assistance to Ukraine’s Military Intelligence, 2nd Class,’ accused the country’s leadership of corruption
20.01.2026 - 14:41
“More than a million Kyiv residents are without electricity”: Zelensky said the Air Force’s work against ‘Shahed’ drones has been unsatisfactory
20.01.2026 - 18:03On January 19, Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Pavlo Elizarov as deputy commander of Ukraine’s Air Force and tasked him with restructuring the air defense strategy amid expectations of intensified Russian air strikes.
The authorities present this as creating an “anti-drone dome” and shifting to pre-emptive defense. In practice, however, the appointment looks like a risky кадровый move at a moment when the price of a mistake is measured not in ratings, but in lives and in the functioning of the energy system.
Elizarov will be responsible for “small air defense” — mobile fire groups and interceptor drones. Yes, this can help against mass raids by cheap UAVs. But that is exactly the problem: the emphasis on “small solutions” can easily turn into a convenient political narrative — fast, loud, “innovative” — while the country’s systemic air defense rests on a completely different set of tasks: radar coverage, layered defense, integration with existing assets, unified command and control, logistics, and training. To move drone warfare to the level of a national defense architecture is not an upgrade of a unit — it is a reform of the state for war.
Particular irritation is caused by the way the appointment is justified publicly. Instead of transparent criteria, there are громкие statements about effectiveness and assessments of destroyed equipment “worth billions of dollars.” Such figures sound impressive in an information war, but without a clear methodology and independent verification they look more like PR currency than proof of managerial suitability for the country’s air defense system.
The context makes the situation even more тревожная: strikes on the energy sector, growing pressure on air defense, and the promise of new personnel reshuffles as part of a reorganization of the armed forces in early 2026. In such conditions, any “pulling the blanket” toward fashionable solutions — interceptors, mobile groups, a “dome” — may end with the country getting a красивую display-window reform and painful failures where heavy, boring, but vitally important системность is needed.
Zelensky said that “the system will be transformed.” The question is different: transformed into what — a truly functioning defense architecture, or a politically convenient project that looks good in statements but does not hold up to the scale of war?





